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COMPARATIVE DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES
OF SOUTH KOREA AND TAIWAN AS




This paper examines the interplay of economic development and
trade policies in South Korea and Taiwan.' Although many differ-
ences exist between the two states, both have identified economic de-
velopment as a central national policy goal linked explicitly to national
security, even national survival. Both have targeted international
trade as a key means of promoting economic development. Thus,
trade policy, broadly defined, has served as one of the principal com-
ponents of their economic development strategies. Of course, many
other factors impinge upon trade policy formation - the national im-
peratives against which all policy must be weighed, economic opportu-
nities and constraints, the domestic political process through which
societal interests and pressures are managed, and the international
political process through which competing interests are accommo-
dated - but far more than in most other developing states, trade pol-
icy in Korea and Taiwan has given primacy to economic growth.
There are similarities as well as great differences between the two
states. Both have experienced rapid economic growth and, in each,
growth has depended strongly upon exports. Economic progress itself
came to be a key aspect in both governments' legitimacy. There has
been widespread support for detailed government intervention, but in
the context of a firm commitment to market-based economies. Both
states also have faced a severe and persistent external threat. The per-
ceived need for economic progress and an external security threat have
• Director of Economic Studies, The Hudson Institute.
1. This paper draws heavily on a series of Hudson Institute research studies. The most im-
portant include: J. WHEELER & P. WOOD, TRADE POLICY FORMATION IN DEVELOPING COUN-
TRIES (1986); J. WHEELER & P. WOOD, BEYOND RECRIMINATION: PERSPECTIVES ON U.S.-
TAIWAN TRADE TENSIONS (1987); M. ERNST & J. WHEELER, THE IMPACT OF INDUSTRIAL
COUNTRY PROTECTIONISM ON SELECTED LDCs (1987); R. COHEN & J. WHEELER, GOVERN-
MENT INVESTMENT IN INDIGENOUS ELECTRONICS INDUSTRIES: INTERNATIONAL COMPARI-
SONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES (working title) (to be published by Westview
Press in Summer 1990).
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justified strong government intervention and, in turn, have been used
to justify relatively authoritarian political systems.
The economic success that occurred under authoritarian direction
now challenges that high degree of control. Both countries face great
pressures for political liberalization and wider participation in policy
decisions, pressures that have been accommodated remarkably well.
Expanding participation in policy decisions in both countries probably
has gone further in economic policymaking than any other area.
These and many other factors have sharply altered the economic
and trade policymaking process over the past three decades. In partic-
ular, economic success has altered development goals, which, in turn,
have changed trade policy priorities. Further, use of trade policy has
become more constrained as export growth has brought both countries
into conflict with their trading partners. In order to address these is-
sues, it is necessary, first, to review the evolution of economic develop-
ment strategy in each of the two countries and, second, to summarize
the trade policies used to implement that strategy. Subsequently, an
assessment of both the common and the unique roles that trade policy
has played in the economic development of each country will be
provided.




Few countries have ever achieved the rapid and stable growth that
Taiwan has experienced since the 1950s. This success was all the more
remarkable because of extraordinary burdens faced by Taiwan in 1949
2. This section provides a brief overview of a complex history. More detail can be found in:
J. WHEELER & P. WOOD, BEYOND RECRIMINATION, supra note 1; Lee & Liang, Taiwan, in
DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES IN SEMI-INDUSTRIAL ECONOMIES at ch. 10 (Bela Balassa &
Associates eds. 1982); MODELS OF DEVELOPMENT: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF ECONOMIC
GROWTH IN SOUTH KOREA AND TAIWAN (L. Lau ed. 1986); Y. Wu, BECOMING AN
INDUSTRIALIZED NATION: ROC's DEVELOPMENT ON TAIWAN (1985); ExPERIENCES AND
LESSONS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN TAIWAN (K. Li & T. Yu eds. 1982); Conference of
U.S.-Taiwan Economic Relations (Mar. 27-28, 1985) (published by the Chung-hua Institution
for Economic Research, Taipei); Foreign Industrial Targeting and Its Effects on U.S. Industries,
Phase III: Brazil, Canada, the Republic of Korea, Mexico, and Taiwan, USITC Pub. No. 1632
(1985) [hereinafter FOREIGN INDUSTRIAL TARGETING]; 1984 JOINT CONFERENCE ON THE
INDUSTRIAL POLICIES OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA (Dec. 27-
28, 1984) (published by the Chung-hua Institution for Economic Research, Taipei) [hereinafter
1984 JOINT CONFERENCE]; INDUSTRIAL POLICIES OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND THE
REPUBLIC OF CHINA (Nov. 21-22, 1985) (published by the Korea Development Institute, Seoul)
[hereinafter CONFERENCE ON INDUSTRIAL POLICIES]; Liang & Liang, Trade Strategy and
Industrial Policy in Taiwan, EON. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1986, at 1-2; Ninth Medium-Term Economic
Development Plan for Taiwan (1986-1989)-External Sector, ECON. REV., Jan.-Feb. 1987, at 11-
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when the Kuomintang (KMT) retreated to the island. The island was
cut off from its former major trading partners (Japan and China), in-
flation was out of control, the infrastructure had been damaged se-
verely during the war, and there was a severe shortage of management
personnel. Among the most important factors behind Taiwan's suc-
cess has been its stable government combined with a commitment to a
steady, financially conservative, pragmatic, and growth-oriented pol-
icy mix.
In the early postwar years, the main initiatives were land reform,
stabilization of inflation and the exchange rate, infrastructure con-
struction, and protection of local producers (import substitution poli-
cies) to build industries to meet domestic market demand. It was clear
by the mid-1950s that the domestic market was too small to maintain
rapid economic progress under an import substitution umbrella.
Slowly, policy shifted towards an export orientation. Some changes
were made as early as 1955, but it was not until 1958-1960 that major
policy reform actually occurred.
The process of reorienting industrialization strategy toward ex-
ports involved a wide variety of policy initiatives, ranging from cor-
recting the seriously overvalued exchange rate to reducing foreign
exchange controls, easing import barriers - especially for inputs to
the production of exported commodities - and progressively tighten-
ing the criteria for providing protection to domestic manufacturing
industries. More explicit export incentives included tariff and tax rate
cuts, special privileges for the use of exporters' foreign exchange earn-
ings, low interest rate loans, privileged financial access, export promo-
tion facilities, and the establishment of duty-free export processing
zones, among others.
With the economic uncertainties of the early 1970s, it became obvi-
ous that there were certain weaknesses in the Taiwan economy that
required policy attention. 3 Most important, it became clear that con-
tinued economic success would require that domestic industries accel-
erate their transformation from reliance on relatively unskilled labor
to the production of products requiring more skilled labor, higher
technology, and greater capital intensity. The government was partic-
ularly interested in expanding the backward links from exports to do-
mestic production and introduced a variety of import substitution
measures. Even so, the overall policy structure remained export-ori-
ented and change was evolutionary.
3. Such economic uncertainties included global inflation, the first oil shock, the breakdown of
the Bretton-Woods system of fixed exchange rates, the precipitous American withdrawal from
Vietnam, etc.
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This industrial policy focus on the promotion of higher skill and
technology-intensive industries increased dramatically at the end of
the decade. Informatics (advanced electronics, software, and various
related activities and industries) became a central focus of Taiwan's
vision of the future. Since then, investment rules facing foreign firms
have been eased, transfer of technology has been encouraged, and a
variety of specific incentives to encourage high technology firms have
been introduced, including low interest rate loans, extended tax holi-
days, liberalization of venture capital regulations, the formation of the
Hsinchu Science Park, and extensive public support of R & D.
In contrast to South Korea, however, the policies used in Taiwan
tended to rely more on indirect incentives than on direct levers to in-
fluence economic development. Nevertheless, the desire to upgrade
domestic production led to the use of a variety of direct grants, loans,
and other measures targeted at selected firms in the 1982-1986 four-
year plan. Even so, the identification of firms to receive promotional
benefits was based more on qualifying criteria than on firm-specific
targeting. Besides the general support measures, the government com-
mitted special assistance to strategic industries by directly investing in
selected projects and by underwriting a variety of research and devel-
opment initiatives. The basic structure laid out in the 1982-1986 plan
carried over into the Ninth Medium-Term Economic Development
Plan (1986-1989).
Taiwan has pursued a somewhat more cautious and pragmatic in-
dustrial development strategy than South Korea. Its approaches to
directing economic decisions are more indirect, but nonetheless exten-
sive. The government has played a particularly strong role in main-
taining a stable investment climate, in investing in needed
infrastructure, and in the use of government corporations to develop
key large-scale, high-risk basic industries. However, the Taiwan gov-
ernment does not exercise nearly the same level of influence over the
business sector as does the South Korean government.
Although the more cautious and pragmatic approach to economic
management in Taiwan has created a sounder economic structure than
that in South Korea, the approach also has had its drawbacks. Tai-
wan's great strength has been its highly successful small and medium-
size companies, which possess great flexibility. But this strength is
also a weakness: there is a shortage of large firms capable of moving
into high technology areas requiring very large investments.
B. Overall Industrial Policy
As noted, Taiwan's authorities have pursued an array of policies
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designed to increase the competitiveness of domestic industries and
promote the industrialization of the island. They have done this
through a variety of broad macroeconomic and structural policies,
combined with selective industrial policy tools.
The basic framework guiding industrial policy is a series of interre-
lated annual, mid-term (four- to five-year), and long-range (ten-year)
plans. This planning process, under various guises, has been in place
since 1953. The plans are not rigid directives. Rather, they are flexi-
ble descriptions of a central policy thrust, around which details adjust
frequently as economic conditions change.
The central entity in the planning process is the Council for Eco-
nomic Planning and Development (CEPD). Besides planning, the
CEPD is deeply involved in economic projections, monitoring major
development projects, and reviewing budget proposals and policy ini-
tiatives by other ministries. Depending upon the CEPD's chairman, it
can play an extraordinarily powerful role, or it can be relatively
ineffective.
The Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEA) has the operational
responsibility for the administration of industrial policy and trade.
The Industrial Development Bureau of MOEA develops sector-spe-
cific plans to meet the overall economic plans. It also serves as the
initiating entity for changes in tariffs and in investment and financial
incentives to support planning goals. Other responsibilities of MOEA
include public enterprise policy, administration of import licensing,
and administration of Taiwan's export processing zones.
The Ministry of Finance is involved in industrial policy through its
oversight of tax and investment policies, while the Central Bank of
China plays an important industrial policy role through its administra-
tion of foreign exchange controls and its oversight of the central indus-
trial policy banks.
Industrial policy strategy has gone through a variety of distinct
phases reflecting the major challenges confronting Taiwan and impor-
tant shifts in the goals selected by the government. Figure 1 shows
these basic strategies and policy directions.
(Vol. 11:472
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Figure 1
PHASES OF INDUSTRIAL STRATEGY
Development Strategy
1950s
A. Introducing Economic Planning in
1953 after the Completion of Postwar
Rehabilitation
B. Implementing a "Land-to-the-Tiller"
Program, Stimulating Agricultural
Production, and Improving Rural
Living Standards
C. Developing Labor-Intensive Import-
Substituting Industries to Promote
Economic Stability
1960s
A. Improving the Investment Climate and
Encouraging Saving
B. Establishing Export-Oriented Industries
to Create New Job Opportunities
C. Developing New Agricultural Products
and Promoting Agricultural Exports
1970s
A. Increasing Infrastructural Investment
and Eliminating Transport Bottlenecks
B. Promoting Backward Integration by
Establishing Intermediate Goods
Industries
C. Developing Basic and Heavy Industries
to Improve Industrial Structure
D. Accelerating Rural Development and
Raising Farm Income
1980s
A. Raising Energy Efficiency, Improving
Energy Conservation, and Obtaining
Secure Supplies
B. Speeding Transformation of the
Industrial Structure by Promoting the
Growth of "Strategic Industries"
C. Encouraging the Merger and
Modernization of Labor-Intensive
Enterprises and the Automation of
Labor-Intensive Production
D. Strengthening Development of
Manpower and Science and
Technology
E. Continuing to Promote Balanced
Economic and Social Development
Changing Structure of Industry
1950s
A. Sugar, Flour, Edible Oil, Canned &
Other Processed Food Products
B. Textiles
C. Plywood, Cement, Sheet Glass
1960s
A. Consumer Electronic Products:
Transister Radios, TV Sets
B. Refrigerators, Air Conditioners,
Washing Machines, Sewing Machines




B. Iron & Steel, Machine Tools
C. Shipbuilding, Motor Vehicles
1980s
A. Electrical and Non-Electrical
Machinery
B. Information
C. Other Allied Industries
Source: CEPD, Economic Development.- Taiwan, Republic of China (April 1985), pp. 15, 22.
The changed global economic conditions following the second oil
shock and America's recognition of the PRC led to a substantial revi-
sion in Taiwan's overall industrial policy framework. The tendency
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towards promoting large scale projects of the late 1970s was scaled
back considerably and industrialization plans were more finely honed.
Moreover, the Taiwanese government adopted a variety of narrowly
targeted supports for private firms in key sectors. Concurrently, the
authorities slowly opened domestic markets to foreign competition
and aggressively sought greater foreign investment. Policy has fo-
cused on accelerating the shift from labor-intensive to more capital
and technology-intensive products. In particular, the government has
been seeking ways to expand the transfer, development, and adoption
of new technology and management know-how.
The change in policy focus can be demonstrated by contrasting the
policy direction identified by Premier Chiang Ching-Kuo in a speech
to the ROC legislature on February 25, 1977 with the events that fol-
lowed. This speech identified issues and problems that needed change,
yet viewed the policy adjustment process as a gradual one, building
around the slogan "Growth with Stability."
In 1978, the broad direction of economic policy remained the
same, though with some changes in emphasis. The priority given to
technology-intensive industries was increased and a strong initiative
was taken to expand science and technology manpower. It was at this
time that the science-based industry park at Hsinchu was founded and
a variety of initiatives were taken to expand research and develop-
ment. A variety of other emphases were changed, but the basic goals
remained the same. In some ways the policies inaugurated in 1978 can
be viewed as the transition to the policy emphasis that was to come.
The rupture of diplomatic relations with the United States in 1979
forced economic planning to focus on an array of options that eventu-
ally would permit Taiwan much greater independence. It was at this
time that industrial electronics was singled out for special preference
along with several other high-technology industries, later expanded to
include a variety of microelectronic and computer industries loosely
called the "Information Industry."
The broad consensus that Taiwan must restructure itself rapidly
towards more knowledge-intensive industries led to a variety of experi-
ments, new initiatives, short-, medium- and long-term plans, etc., as
the government and private sector searched for appropriate measures
to meet this goal. These various experiments may be seen as address-
ing and implementing policy in five specific categories. 4 Promotion
and support of knowledge-intensive industries requires:
1) Initial support of domestic entrepreneurs who already pos-
4. Y. Wu, BECOMING AN INDUSTRIALIZED NATION, supra note 2.
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sess capabilities that can be built upon, combined with efforts to
attract foreign entrepreneurs;
2) Longer-term acquisition of new knowledge through public
and private domestic R & D investment - both in order to adapt
foreign technology to local enterprises and to lay the foundation
for the creation of new and better technologies in the future;
3) Allocation of scarce resources - including both choices
among industries regarding incentives and preferences, as well as
choices among subsectors and firms within targeted industries;
4) New manpower skills and experience for which planners
must allow both immediate acquisition and long-term training of
qualified individuals. [Education, training, and experience are all
required, not only for scientists and engineers, but also for techni-
cians, managers, planners, and administrators who are needed to
run the knowledge-intensive companies that R & D seeks to
stimulate;]
5) Adapting legal, regulatory, and other institutions to the
new characteristics of technology-intensive firms and products.
[One may ask, for example, what trade-off between proprietary
and public rights is best for the nation's economic health.]
The ten-year economic plan adopted in 1980 was the vehicle used
to set these new strategies into motion. It clearly focused on a deepen-
ing of the industrial structure through selected import substitution, the
promotion of higher technology industries, the shifting of traditional
exporters into using higher technology production methods, and diver-
sification of both the export product mix and of Taiwan's main trading
partners. 5
The industrial priorities in this ten-year plan were embodied in six
criteria to be used to screen industry requests for priority treatment. 6
These included the following:
* Linkage to other major industries in Taiwan,
* Low energy intensity,
* Low pollution,
* Contribution to net exports,
* High domestic value added, and
* Technology intensity.
Apart from these screening criteria, three strategic industries were
5. Diversification ot trading partners was particularly unsuccessful. Over the subsequent six
years, U.S. absorption of Taiwan's exports rose from approximately thirty percent to over fifty
percent.
6. For a detailed discussion of policy instruments, see Foreign Industrial Targeting, supra
note 2, at 236-82.
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identified: information, electronics, and machinery. Within each of
these industries, a variety of products was also identified for priority.
Some of those selected in the electronics industry, for example, were
instruments, video cassette recorders, telecommunications equipment,
and computers. Moreover, during the plan's term, the government ex-
plicitly targeted support to seventeen major research and development
projects in the higher technology industries. Table 1 sets out the plan-
ning goals.
Table 1
TAIWAN'S INDUSTRY-SPECIFIC OUTPUT GOALS, 1980-89
: Average
Share of Share of growth



























Lumber, wood products - - -
All other ------------
Total, manufacturing
1,002 7.3 3,700 10.1 40.0
841 6.1 3,316 9.0 14.7
: 4.4 2,087 5.7 13.2
: 3.7 2,285 6.5 16.7
334 2.4 992 2.7 11.5
3,290 23.9 12,438 34.0 14.3
3.6 1,711 4.7 13.2
791 5.7 2,974 8.1 14.2
584 4.2 1,475 4.0 9.7
1,870 13.5 6,160 16.8 13.2
664 4.8 1,358 3.7 7.4
1.9 664 1.8 9.7
541 3.9 1,226 3.3 8.5
205 1.5 565 1.5 10.7
680 4.9 1,429 3.9 7.7
1,249 9.0 2,689 7.3 8.0
3,601 26.1 7,931 21.5 8.2
5,040 36.6 10,232 27.7 7.3
1,950 14.1 3,916 10.6 7.2
439 3.2 697 1.9 4.7
2,655 19.2 5,619 15.2 8.9
13,801 100.0 36,803 100.0 10.3
Source: American Institute in Taiwan, Taipei, AITGRAM 02413, May 13,
019, May 15, 1980, as reported in USITC Pub. No. 1632, January 1985.
1980, and AIT air pouch No. A-
The plan also identified a variety of other targeted investment
projects (twelve major and one-hundred-twenty smaller projects) to-
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talling some $86 billion, with most of the funds to be provided by
government authorities. These projects related almost entirely to
infrastructure.
The plan was also explicit about the intent to impose export and
local content requirements on foreign direct investment to help direct
the patterns of domestic industrial development. Both traditional and
new methods were relied on to implement these plans. The more
traditional methods included market protection, investment and ex-
port incentives, and low cost loans. Various new programs were intro-
duced to meet a variety of special needs, including the central satellite
firm system, the Hsinchu Science Based Industrial Park, new man-
power development programs, and a variety of centrally sponsored re-
search projects.,
1. Market Protection
Domestic market protection has always been an important aspect
of Taiwan's industrial policy. Import licenses, access to foreign ex-
change, screening of foreign investment, and preferential government
procurement have served as the main instruments to protect local in-
dustries and expand the domestic industrial base. Indeed, protecting
the domestic market while providing preferential access to imported
inputs proved to be a particularly powerful device for promoting
targeted industries.
Since the late 1970s, Taiwan has liberalized many aspects of its
import regime. Average tariffs remain fairly high and many import
products continue to face specialized bans and case-by-case import li-
censing. Restrictions have been reduced substantially since the early
1980s.
Taiwan's trade (both imports and exports) must usually be li-
censed. However, most products are now in the automatic approval
category. In the mid-1980s, about twenty percent of the value of Tai-
wan's imports, mostly luxury goods and certain products competing
with local production, fell into the controlled category. Controlled
items require specific approval by the Board of Foreign Trade of the
Ministry of Economic Affairs and must be imported directly by the
end users.
Besides licensing, imports are subject to tariffs and procedural de-
lays by the Customs Bureau of the Ministry of Finance. The highest
protection, mostly in the form of tariffs, is assessed on products of
importance to Taiwan, such as electronics, and on luxury goods. Per-
manent tariffs on most goods must be approved by the legislature, but
the Executive Yuan has the authority to raise or lower tariffs by fifty
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percent, without new legislation, for a period of up to one year. More-
over, the authorities can increase tariffs on products that compete with
domestic industries without legislative approval. Despite the rela-
tively high duty structure, the actual value of duties collected is low.
Imports into the export processing zones are duty-free. Firms in
targeted industries often qualify for rebates or deferred payment of
import duties.
Foreign investment is highly promoted. In the past, approvals
have usually hinged on a firm's willingness to commit to purchasing a
certain percentage of its inputs locally, as well as committing to export
a certain percentage of its output. More recently, approvals have also
included commitments to transfer technology. Foreign firms have not
complained much about these rules since the market was small and
exports were the main investment goal. In any event, performance
requirements have been eased in recent years.
Government procurement has been another important technique
for protecting the domestic market. Various government entities are
the major market for sophisticated research and scientific equipment,
computers, telecommunications products, and the output from a vari-
ety .of other targeted industries. Not only does this permit the govern-
ment to tailor specific procurements to reflect products available
locally and to reduce investment risk by assuring long-term orders, but
it also permits it to establish standards that will fuel private sector
development.
This process is aided by having most public procurement handled
through two entities: The Central Trust of China and the Taiwan
Supply Bureau. In principle, however, all contracts with a value over
US$100,000 are open to foreign bidding. As of the mid-1980s, pro-
curement competitions granted a fifteen percent price preference to
domestic products. In other words, foreign goods could be imported
to meet government agency needs only if their delivered cost was fif-
teen percent less than that of essentially identical domestic products.
2. Tax Policy
Tax policy has been one of Taiwan's more important industrial
policy tools. In general, foreign and domestic firms receive equal
treatment under the tax code. The Statute for the Encouragement of
Investment has been the principal legal framework permitting the tax
system to be used to advance industrial policy. Specific incentives are
spelled out in this statute. Various criteria used to qualify firms for
special treatment are identified in implementing regulations. These
[Vol. 11:472
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criteria are altered as industrial policy goals and market conditions
change.
Taiwan has used two types of tax incentives to promote industry.
First, incentives are provided to firms in particular segments of ex-
isting industries that the authorities feel will be competitive in the fu-
ture. Eligibility criteria are spelled out on a detailed industry-by-
industry basis and may include very specific characteristics related to
exporting, achieving economies of scale, increasing domestic content,
acquiring and upgrading production technology, etc.
The second approach uses tax incentives for designated strategic
industries. Under the first approach, a few firms in many'industries
would qualify; under the second approach, most firms in a few
targeted industries would qualify. For example, many firms in such
industries as electric machinery, computer system products, consumer
electronics products, electronic components, electronic communica-
tion equipment, electronic industrial systems, and computer software
fall within the scope of the strategic industry definition.
Various tax benefits apply to firms that fall within one of these two
categories. The main benefits for targeted industries include tax holi-
days, accelerated depreciation, reduced income tax rates, and exemp-
tions or deferrals of import duties. A variety of additional tax
incentives are available for exporting firms, although most of these
measures are designed to avoid double taxation. Besides export incen-
tives, there are a variety of other general tax incentives designed to
achieve various goals. Some of the more important goals are acquiring
foreign technology, encouraging listings on the stock exchange, and
providing support for mergers.
3. Financial Market Policy
Taiwan's financial system remains tightly controlled by authorities
and, as such, has been a strong mechanism of industrial policy. Since
private industry depends on debt financing for some seventy to eighty
percent of its capital, the government has considerable leverage. Be-
cause the economy is dominated by small and medium-sized busi-
nesses, governmental direction of financial flows has been rather more
indirect than has been the case in South Korea. Even after some liber-
alization of Taiwan's financial system, beginning in 1982, the govern-
ment, retains extensive control.
Two of the eleven state-controlled banks have special roles in in-
dustrial targeting: The Bank of Communications and The Export-Im-
port Bank of China. The Bank of Communications is the most
important for carrying out industrial policy. It is charged with pro-
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moting the development of the manufacturing, mining, transportation,
and public utilities sectors. The Bank of Communications extends a
variety of concessionary loans and credit guarantees to capital inten-
sive industries, and provides advice to customers on management and
technical innovation issues. The Bank of Communications was only
officially designated a development bank in 1979; before that, it was
principally involved in infrastructure financing. The Export-Import
Bank of China (founded in 1979) provides loans and credits. It ex-
tends loan guarantees for exports of plant and equipment as well as for
overseas construction projects. It also offers export insurance. In ad-
dition, it underwrites imports of raw materials and technical services.
Loan terms generally comply with OECD guidelines.
Besides these two, a variety of other specialized funds have been
created. A Small and Medium Business Credit Guarantee Fund was
founded in 1974 to help smaller firms secure private financing. It pro-
vides credit guarantees to financial institutions that lend to small and
medium-sized businesses. The China Development Corporation
(CDC), a semiprivate trust company, also invests directly in targeted
industries. The CDC, in particular, is favoring technology intensive
industries in its lending policies. Most of the funding for the industrial
policy related banks comes from the postal savings system.
C. New Directions in Industrial Policy 7
Special weaknesses of the Taiwan economy have led to the adop-
tion of various new industrial policy initiatives, combined with
changes in the detailed implementation of the more traditional meas-
ures discussed above. Two particular weaknesses stand out: 1) the
scale barrier faced by even the most successful small and medium-
sized firms in mounting the capital investment required to achieve
competitive stature in higher technology industries, and 2) limited do-
mestic research and development.
The main mechanisms of Taiwan's science and technology promo-
tion policy have been government research laboratories, government-
sponsored private research efforts, a variety of inducements for private
firms to expand their own R & D, and programs to develop or attract
the necessary skilled manpower. The science and technology develop-
ment plan covering 1982 to 1989 called for raising national expendi-
tures on R & D by fifteen percent a year. About half of this increase
would come directly from government budgets, another twenty per-
7. Besides the source noted above, see Simon & Schive, Taiwan, in NATIONAL POLICIES FOR
DEVELOPING HIGH TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY: INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS at ch. 9 (1986).
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cent from public enterprises, and the remainder from private compa-
nies. A variety of mechanisms were introduced to try to meet these
goals.
The government of Taiwan set up a general purpose development
fund, a science and technology development fund, and a defense indus-
try development fund, all under the Ministry of Finance, to assist in
the formation of technology-oriented firms. Moreover, the Bank of
Communications was to provide seed money to a limited number of
firms in strategic industries.
In 1983, a ten-point plan for encouraging technology development
was adopted. The Industrial Development Bureau (IDB) of the Min-
istry of Economic Affairs was given implementation responsibility. A
Committee for the Development of New Products was to oversee the
IDB's activities. Although it acts under the auspices of the Ministry
of Economic Affairs, the Committee includes representatives from the
Council for External Trade and Development, the National Science
Council, the Institute for the Information Industry, the National Bu-
reau of Standards, as well as the IDB. The plan introduced a technol-
ogy development subsidy program to encourage research and
development into new industrial products and technology.
The IDB prepared an initial list of products whose developers
would qualify for development studies. This list is now updated annu-
ally. The program has focused mainly on computers and electronics
research. Applications for development subsidies must be submitted
to the IDB, although actual funding comes from the New Industrial
Product Foundation set up under the plan. The Foundation is funded
by direct appropriations from the Executive Yuan's development fund,
as well as from private sector contributions and receipts from success-
ful ventures.
The Hsinchu Industrial Park, started in 1980 with the full financial
backing of the Taiwan government, was designed to bring together a
variety of public and private research institutes, academic institutions,
and high technology firms. Firms investing in the park receive sub-
stantial tax benefits, concessionary financing, subsidized land costs,
and a variety of centrally provided support services, such as ware-
houses, factories, and telecommunications facilities. Despite these
benefits, initial occupancy rates lagged behind expectations. The park
has been more successful in recent years. Specific incentives to inves-
tors in the park include the following:
* Exemption from import duties on machinery, raw materials,
supplies, fuels, and semi-finished goods for use by the firms. If
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goods are sold domestically, however, then duties will have to
be paid.
" Commodity and business tax exemption for exported products.
" A waiver on foreign exchange restrictions on interest, divi-
dends, and invested capital remittances.
" Potential access to funding from the National Science Council
and two designated financial institutions for up to forty-nine
percent of the investment.
* Tax deductions on all expenditures on research and
development.
* A variety of other privileges, such as subsidized land rental and
low interest rate financing.
The Taiwanese government has founded a variety of research insti-
tutes that work with private firms to develop new products, to identify
and acquire new technology, and to conduct research and develop-
ment for ultimate transfer to private enterprise. Perhaps the premier
laboratory is the Industrial Technology Research Institute (ITRI),
founded in 1973. (Figure 2 presents a basic organization chart.) Its
mission was to develop and acquire key technologies in a wide range of
industries, including electronics, information, and production automa-
tion. The Institute is organized as an autonomous body and, in close
cooperation with industry, conducts some of the most advanced
manufacturing research in Taiwan. Indeed, the Institute often under-
takes research and development for manufacturers for a straight fee or
on an equity sharing basis.
A major initiative has been the development of human resources.
This effort has focused not only on scientists and engineers, but also on
the array of managers, social scientists, and administrators required by
business and government operations in a more advanced society. New
and expanded programs have sought to attract immigrants from the
large pool of highly educated, ethnic Chinese outside Taiwan. Some of
these individuals left the island to attend school and never returned,
but this is only a part of the total. Professionals from Hong Kong are
a key target at present. Programs have also drawn foreign non-Chi-
nese nationals, especially as visiting experts, but also as permanent res-
idents. Second, of course, is the major push dating back to the early
1980s to expand the training and research activities of universities, to
promote training activities of research institutes, and to establish other
training institutions.
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Figure 2
INDUSTRIAL TECHNOLOGY RESEARCH INSTITUTE
Organizational Chart
Efforts to expand the size of local firms in order to improve their
ability to undertake both R & D and investment in more capital-in-
tensive industries have been made. However, there is a great deal of
political ambivalence about large firms in Taiwan. Large trading firms
have been promoted since 1978. Various tax benefits are given to firms
that list on the stock exchange. Other tax benefits support mergers. A
Central-Satellite firm system was established to provide incentives for
firms to develop direct links with their subcontractors. None of these
programs has been particularly successful. However, the average firm
size is growing.
As noted above, companies manufacturing goods that fall within
the identified strategic industries are entitled to a variety of incen-
tives.8 Reduced interest rates loans are available for,
8. The following policy outline is summarized from F.B.R. PTY. LTD., TAIWAN COMPUTER
AND RELATED EQUIPMENT 44-66 (1987) (prepared for the American Institute in Taiwan).
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i) Investment in strategic industry,
ii) Purchase of locally produced machinery,
iii) Purchases of automation equipment,
iv) Investment in new products, new technology, or overseas
marketing.
In addition to the above, companies, including those with foreign
ownership, may apply for help under the auspices of "Encouragement
of Technology Intensive Industries." The objectives of this program
include:
i) Encouraging the development of key high technology
industries;
ii) Encouraging the development of new products;
iii) Continuing to provide incentives aimed at encouraging high
technology foreign firms to set up operations in Taiwan, as
well as encouraging technological cooperation between local
and foreign firms;
iv) Introducing new technology to stimulate development of the
local information industry;
v) Encouraging the application of new information technology,
with a view toward promoting automated production
processes and scientific management practices.
The "Statute for Encouragement of Investment" provides the fol-
lowing tax incentives:
i) Technology-intensive industries shall be exempt from corpo-
rate income tax for a period of five successive years, starting
from any fiscal year designated by the enterprise concerned,
provided it is within four years after the enterprise begins
marketing its products and rendering services.
ii) A technology-intensive enterprise expanded through capital
increase is eligible for one of the following privileges:
1. The enterprise shall be entitled to exemption from corpo-
rate income tax of the portion of income generated by the
increased investment for a period of four successive years,
starting from any year, provided it is within four years af-
ter commencement of operation.
2. The enterprise will be allowed accelerated depreciation.
3. The enterprise may deduct fifteen percent of the increased
investment for the year of capital increase from its taxable
income for corporate income tax, and may spread this tax
deduction over the next four years.
iii) Corporate income tax and surtaxes imlosed on a technology-
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intensive enterprise shall not exceed twenty-two percent of its
annual business income.
D. Outlook
Recent trends and export successes have only strengthened the
consensus in Taiwan that forcing producers towards higher technol-
ogy is central to Taiwan's economic success and that the informatics
industry is of particular importance to this high technology push. Pol-
icy is consistently focused on establishing both a technological and a
manufacturing base on the island.
Although the government continues to play a major leadership and
interventionist role, a constant long-term goal has been the promotion
of private industry. Even when large capital infusions were provided
to selected key product areas, the government always retained private
management and control. Policy, however, has been more successful
in developing a manufacturing base than in building a technological
base. Research and development still very much depends on "govern-
ment pull." The private sector has not expanded its own research and
development spending anywhere to the extent targeted by the
authorities.
The overall strategy of fostering rapid development of firms that
have identified a market niche will continue. The direction of policy
development has not always been entirely successful. Indeed, the con-
tinued fragmentation of the software industry and the lack of success
in stimulating private sector R & D investment are the most important
failures retarding future development. Other problems include the
very limited response to policies designed to promote the growth of
large firms, legal difficulties that have prevented taking full advantage
of some of the tax incentives, and delays in the provision of financial
support that have resulted in postponed projects and investment.
Some of these problems reflect inherent conflicts between policy
goals and Taiwan's economic structure. For example, the small size of
the average firm and broad-based entrepreneurial spirit have been key
sources of Taiwan's flexibility and economic dynamism. Yet larger,
professionally managed firms have become even more important to
Taiwan's future as technology, capital, and global marketing have be-
come more central to the state's most competitive exports. Unlike
some larger countries, Taiwan is too small to use a sheltered domestic
market to subsidize exports for very long or for very many products -
the costs are far too high. Moreover, with enormous trade surpluses
and a desire to play a growing role in multilateral economic organiza-
tions (as a partial substitute for their lack of diplomatic recognition),
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there are great external pressures on Taiwan's remaining trade
barriers.
Nonetheless, the state's economic development plans clearly con-
tain a strong export bias, as well as a series of powerful, if selective,
import substitution goals. The trade policy levers used in the past to
help guide domestic development have now been largely negotiated
away. However, various industrial policy incentives will continue to
be manipulated to achieve trade objectives.
III. EVOLUTION OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY IN
SOUTH KOREA9
A. Overview
Like Taiwan, South Korea is one of the most successful export-
oriented developing countries. Many factors have contributed to this
success: the largely positive international trade environment, a good
relationship with the United States, the hard work and savings-ori-
ented aspects of its neo-Confucian culture, and a political and social
commitment to economic progress. However, many other countries
whose external environment and internal resources were equal or su-
perior to those in South Korea have not performed nearly as well.
Government policy has played a key initiating and supporting role.
The instruments used by the South Korean government to support
economic progress look much the same as any list of development pol-
icies, ranging across tax benefits, domestic market protection, alloca-
tion of often subsidized credit, the use of state enterprises, direct
political influence on business decisions, granting selective monopoly
power to large local firms (chaebol), and a variety of other induce-
ments. One characteristic that distinguishes the extensive government
intervention in South Korea from that in many other developing coun-
tries is the commitment to building large, internationally competitive
firms. In those industries targeted by the Korean government, bureau-
cratic and other interests have always been repressed, if necessary, to
ensure economic success on world markets. The policy style of both
the government and the large companies has also been characterized
by a relatively aggressive, high-risk approach. Rather than taking
9. This section draws on a variety of sources; the most important general sources include: A.
KEARNEY & P. WooD, SOUTH KOREA: THE POLITICIZATION OF TRADE POLICY (1986);
Westphal & Kim, Korea, in DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES IN SEMI-INDUSTRIAL ECONOMIES at
ch. 87 (Bela Balassa & Associates eds. 1982); P. HASAN & D. RAO, KOREA: POLICY ISSUES FOR
LONG-TERM DEVELOPMENT (1979); THE WORLD BANK, KOREA: DEVELOPMENT IN A
GLOBAL CONTEXT (1984); Y. RHEE, B. ROSs-LARSON & G. PURSELL, KOREA'S COMPETITIVE
EDGE: MANAGING THE ENTRY INTO WORLD MARKETS (1984); 1984 JOINT CONFERENCE,
supra note 2; and CONFERENCE ON INDUSTRIAL POLICIES, supra note 2.
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small steps to feel out the marketplace, the South Koreans have
tended to take large, fairly elaborate jumps (steel and semiconductors
are examples).
Economic policymaking has gone through three oft-discussed
stages since the conclusion of the Korean War: recovery and recon-
struction, industrialization, and progress toward high technology.
The primary goals just following the war (1953-1961) were to establish
political stability and reconstruct the devastated economy. The poli-
cies followed were largely inward-looking, focused on infrastructure-
building, agricultural development, and land reform. Although eco-
nomic progress was unimpressive by subsequent standards, important
gains were made during this period.
With the ascent to power of Park Chung He in 1961, outward-
focused industrialization became the central economic strategy. Im-
port substitution policies were not eliminated. They were modified
and augmented with policies to make Korean exports competitive on
world markets. President Park and his advisors made the strategic
decision that successful economic progress required major industries
to become internationally competitive, eventually without government
help. Free enterprise remained the central engine of economic pro-
gress, but all economic decision-making had to operate under the um-
brella of strong direct or indirect government influence.
There were two phases of industrialization strategy during the
Park era. From 1962 to 1972, the main structural policies were fo-
cused on 1) rapid modernization of agriculture, and 2) forcing indus-
try to make the transition from producing behind protectionist walls
to contending effectively with foreign market forces. Labor-intensive
manufacturing, primarily of light manufactured goods, was the major
beneficiary. Economic growth rates accelerated, the export share of
gross domestic product expanded from five-and-one-half percent in
1962 to over twenty-nine percent in 1973, and the high inflation rates
of the early postwar years began to be brought down.
By the late 1960s, government incentives generally favored exports
over import substitution and the magnitude of those incentives was
quite substantial, accounting for some thirty percent of the total value
of merchandise exports in 1968.10 For manufacturing exports, how-
ever, the value of the incentives largely offset the recurrent overvalua-
tion of the won and the tariffs on imported inputs, with no net subsidy
relative to world prices. For domestic producers, production for ex-
10. Westphal & Kim, supra note 9, at 217.
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port was still favored over domestic sales. Domestic sales were heavily
taxed while exports were not.
The second industrialization phase of the Park era dates from 1973
to 1979. Policy focused on the development of heavy industry.
Although this shift upstream was a natural evolution of successful
light industry production, several factors accelerated the policy
change: the impact of the first oil shock, growing protectionism in
industrial country markets for textiles and shoes, and the perceived
need to develop an arms industry in order to reduce Korea's depen-
dence on the United States. " Priority was given to investments ih
steel, shipbuilding, industrial electronic equipment, petrochemicals,
and machinery industries, all of which required the acquisition and
use of foreign technologies.
After 1973, the currency underwent a substantial devaluation; gov-
ernment policies were introduced that selectively supported import
substitution in producer goods, consumer durables, and automobiles;
some specific export promotion programs were eliminated; and slow
import liberalization continued. The drive to produce internationally
competitive exports had resulted in an unexpectedly large discrimina-
tion against domestically produced machinery and equipment. Ex-
ports had an undesirably large imported input component. Some of
the policy changes during the 1970s addressed this particular problem.
The policies were not static, however, since the import substitution
policies were selective and changed continuously over time as targeted
industries became competitive. Despite the use of selective protection
to promote heavy industry, the system as a whole retained an export
promotion bias. 12
Rapid industrial growth was successful, but unbalanced, with sig-
nificant political and economic strains. The concentration of the in-
dustrializing effort in a handful of large, modern plants permitted
South Korea to leapfrog over many other developing countries, but
left it vulnerable to shifts in international demand. The economy be-
came overheated, foreign debt accumulated, and inflation reemerged.
A series of major economic shocks added to the pressures on South
Korea, including weather-induced declines in rice production, the sec-
ond oil shock, a recession in the major industrialized countries, and
sharp increases in interest rates on South Korea's foreign debt. More-
l1. This was driven both by America's precipitous withdrawal from Vietnam and by the
support for a U.S. military withdrawal from South Korea early in the Carter Administration.
12. See H. Rhee, Protection Structure of the Developing Countries in South and East Asia
14-16 (1983) (unpublished paper).
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over, enormous political and economic uncertainty emerged following
the assassination of President Park Chung He in 1979.
These political and economic instabilities were short-lived. Shortly
after the coup bringing President Chung Du Wan to power, the gov-
ernment moved promptly to introduce a variety of adjustment policies,
including relaxation of the heavy industrialization drive, selective lib-
eralization of economic activity, and a significant devaluation of the
won. Perhaps the most important part of this economic adjustment
program for industrial policy was the explicit adoption of a more mar-
ket-oriented strategy.
Presidential statements confirmed and legitimized the groundswell
of concern that had emerged earlier among government and business
leaders that South Korea was becoming too complex an economy for
the level of detailed government intervention that existed.' 3 South
Korean exports were encountering increasing difficulty as protection-
ism increased in industrial countries. In addition, the country was at-
tempting to meet its commitments under the GATT Subsidies Code,
adopted in 1980. Government policies thus became much less indus-
try-specific. Incentives became more oriented toward sectors. The
private sector was given greater freedom of choice and many of the
special preferences were reduced or eliminated.
The dramatic emergence of democratic pressures on the govern-
ment, resulting in the election of President Roh and a new parliament,
has not, as yet, altered the basic economic strategy. However, the pol-
icy process has become much more complex.
With the rise in wages and the emergence of a variety of competi-
tors to South Korean products, the policy focus has shifted away from
labor-intensive industries towards promotion of higher value added,
technology-intensive industries. The policies implemented under the
fifth and sixth five-year plans have been designed to support the devel-
opment of science and technology generally, combined with special
promotion of specific high-priority industrial areas. There has been a
much stronger emphasis on the development of indigenous technol-
ogy. Explicit plans have been developed for targeted sectors. Specific
high technology initiatives include a strong emphasis on education and
training of scientists and engineers with advanced degrees, improve-
ment in the productivity of government-supported research and devel-
opment institutions, and pursuit of a variety of major "national
projects" to be developed jointly with industry around technologies of
"critical importance" to future growth. Semiconductors and com-
13. See State-of-the-Union address by President Chung (1982).
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puters were designated as two of these critical technology areas under
the fifth plan.
These initiatives have had a substantial impact on research and
development spending in the country. Before 1982, private compa-
nies' investment in R & D averaged less than one percent of their turn-
over, but jumped to around three percent before mid-decade. In 1979,
there were only forty-three private corporate research institutes; by
the end of 1983, there were 139 and by late 1987 there were over 400.
These private research institutes have been stimulated by a variety of
tax incentives, special privileges, and government funds. Public assist-
ance has helped the larger business firms establish their own central R
& D laboratories. Incentives have also been provided to smaller firms
to establish research and development cooperatives. Some resources
have been devoted to the promotion of basic research. More is
planned under the sixth plan. Government funded R & D institutes
have been instructed to carry out joint projects with private institutes.
Moreover, researchers at both public and private institutes are ex-
empted from military service.
1. The Legal and Institutional Framework for the Promotion of
Higher Technology Industry
Promotion of higher technology activities which became a central
goal of economic policy in the fifth five-year plan (1982-1986), contin-
ued in the sixth five-year plan (1987-1991). However, these programs
built on prior plans and institutions. The broad government policy
guidelines from the 1960s through the 1980s for industrialization and
science and technology are shown in Table 2.
Table 2
KOREAN GOVERNMENT GUIDELINES OVER
THREE DECADES
Period Industrialization Science and Technology
1960s 1) Develop import-substitute 1) Strengthen S & T
industries education
2) Expand export-oriented 2) Build scientific and
light industries technological
infrastructure
3) Support producer goods 3) Promote foreign
industries technology import
1) Expand heavy & chemical
industries
1) Expand technical training1970s
(Vol. I11:472
Winter 1990] Development Strategies of South Korea and Taiwan 495
2) Shift emphasis from 2) Improve institutional
capital import to mechanism for adapting
technology import imported technology
3) Strengthen export- 3) Promote research
oriented industry applicable to industrial
competitiveness needs
1980s 1) Transform industrial 1) Develop and recruit high-
structure on the basis of level scientists and
comparative advantage engineers
2) Expand technology- 2) Promote productivity of
intensive industry R & D
3) Encourage manpower 3) Localize key strategic
development and improve technology
productivity of industries
Source: Ministry of Science and Technology as reported in Korean Exchange
Bank, Monthly Review, Vol. XIX, No. 5, May 1985, p. 15.
High technology industries in general and the electronics indus-
tries specifically, are relative latecomers in the South Korean develop-
ment process. As recently as the late 1970s, research and development
and technology acquisition were primarily focused on expanding the
heavy and chemical industries and offsetting the very large share of
capital and technology imports from abroad required to maintain
competitiveness. Even so, the concern about technology can be traced
back to the 1960s.
The history of the relevant legal and institutional structures can be
summarized briefly. 14
* In 1961, Korea created the Economic Planning Board (EPB) to
lead in the formation and implementation of economic. policy.
* In 1962, the Foreign Capital Inducement Law was enacted
both to control and promote foreign investment and technol-
ogy transfer. Under this law, the acquisition of foreign tech-
nology was subject to the approval of the government. This
policy was relaxed during the 1970s in an effort to expand the
flow of foreign technology into Korea.
" In 1966, the Korea Institute of Science and Technology (KIST)
was founded to engage in contract research with industries.
Although its spectrum of activities was broad, KIST initially
focused on solving relatively straightforward problems of ab-
sorbing technology transfer. Their work became more sophisti-
14. This list draws from a variety of sources, but most heavily from an excellent overview by
Lee, The Role of the Government and R&D Infrastructure for Technology Development, 33 TECH.
FORECASTING & SOC. CHANGE 33-54 (1988).
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cated in the 1970s as companies sought research to enhance
productivity, to increase the local content of their production,
and to improve upon technologies imported from abroad (simi-
lar to earlier Japanese experience). In the 1980s, KIST as-
sumed a different role as industrial firms set up their own
research activities. KIST projects came to be dominated by re-
search into areas of special national interest with the character-
istics of high risk, large externalities, and extended gestation
periods. Over time, KIST has spun off various satellite insti-
tutes designed to specialize in specific areas of high industrial
priority in government planning. These specialized institutes
serve as centers of active research projects and also as centers
of expertise in their fields.
* In 1967, at the end of the successful conclusion of the first Five
Year Economic Development Plan, the Ministry of Science and
Technology (MOST) was created. MOST was given the re-
sponsibility of coordinating all science- and technology-related
policies previously managed by other ministries. In some ways
the overall coordination role was equivalent to the role that the
EPB played for economic policy.
" In 1967, the Law for Advancement of Science and Technology
laid the basis for the government to initiate policy in support of
science and technology.
* In 1969, an industry-specific law to promote the electronics in-
dustries established the strategic importance of electronic prod-
ucts to Korea's future. At the same time, the first eight-year
electronics plan (1969-1976) was adopted.
* In 1971, the Korean Advanced Institute of Science (KAIS) was
established as a "mission-oriented postgraduate school to com-
plement existing universities and colleges." Concurrently, the
faculty and students of KAIS focused on research projects of
interest to Korean industries.
* In 1972, the Korea Scientific and Technological Information
Center (KSTIC) was restructured into an information clearing-
house for scientific information, primarily designed to help lo-
cal companies and research organizations absorb international
transfers of knowledge. KSTIC was later merged with the Ko-
rea International Economics Institute to become the Korea In-
stitute for Industrial Economics and Technology (KIIET).
" In 1972, the Law for Industrial Technology Promotion pro-
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vided a variety of fiscal and financial incentives to private enter-
prises for technology development. Specific instruments
included tariffs on imported research, development, and engi-
neering equipment; tax deductions for annual noncapital
RD&E facilities; a tax credit for investment in RD&E work or
in the commercialization of locally developed technology; and
the establishment of technology reserve funds by large compa-
nies.' 5 Initially this legislation was relatively restrictive, but
various amendments have broadened the scope of the legisla-
tion to include small and medium-sized firms.
* In 1973, the Engineering Services Promotion Law was devel-
oped to support local engineering firms and improve their
product.
* In 1973, the National Technical Qualifications Law introduced
an examination and certification system for professionals in
technical fields.
* In 1973, the Law for the Development of Specially Designated
Research Institutes provided legal, financial, and tax incentives
for both public and private research institutes in specialized
fields.
" In 1973, the National Council for Science and Technology, an
intergovernmental council chaired by the prime minister, was
established to mediate among conflicting interests and integrate
science and technology into economic development policy in a
way that could not be managed by MOST.
* In 1977, the Korea Science and Engineering Foundation was
founded as a funding agency to support research by university
professors.
" In the late 1970s, the "Technopolis," Daeduc Science Town,
was founded as a home for government-funded research insti-
tutes and central laboratories for private enterprises. The goal,
of course, was to stimulate research and development by pro-
viding common research facilities, personnel, and information
pools.
" In 1981, the changing functions of KIST were recognized, and
it was merged with KAIS to become the Korea Advanced In-
stitute of Science and Technology (KAIST).
15. Large firms (measured by annual turnover) could set aside up to twenty percent of corpo-
rate profits before tax in any year to be used for their R & D work in the following two years.
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" In 1981, the Electronics Industry Promotion Law was revised
to emphasize the shift to higher technology production, espe-
cially in products for industrial use.
" In 1982, the National Technology Promotion Conference and
the Technology Promotion Council replaced the National
Council for Science and Technology. The Conference, chaired
by the President of Korea, is held quarterly or semiannually to
focus on issues of utmost national importance and numbers
among its participants a total of about two hundred cabinet
members, national assemblymen, industrialists, scientists and
engineers, etc. The Council is a small group of vice-ministers
of relevant agencies and civilians, appointed from selected rele-
vant organizations, that focuses on practical policy application
issues. MOST is the secretariat to the Council and the Council
is often chaired by the minister of MOST sitting in for the
President.
" In 1982, the Korea Technology Development Corporation was
founded as a venture capital organization to stimulate the de-
velopment of technology-based firms.
" In 1982, the second long-term Electronics Industry Develop-
ment Plan was adopted (1983-1991), along with the MOST
four-year semiconductor and computer R & D plan (1983-
1986).
" Throughout the period since the late 1970s, private industry
research institutes have been founded at an accelerated pace,
numbering over four-hundred by late 1987.
A parallel major initiative pursued by the government of Korea to
promote high technology industries has been in the area of manpower
development. Although the South Koreans have a historic cultural
commitment to education and training, the pace and direction of eco-
nomic progress outstripped the supply of qualified manpower. The
transition from labor-intensive industry toward more skill- and tech-
nology-intensive industry has presented a major challenge to the edu-
cation system. Indeed, government expenditures on education have
become a major share of the budget, over twenty percent in 1985
(some 3.5 percent of GNP, see Table 3). However, government ex-
penditures represent only about thirty percent of the total expendi-
tures on education; the remainder is borne by the private sector.
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Table 3




Education Ratio of Central Government
(in million won) Expenditures on Education
Current 1970 To Government To GNP
Year Price Price Budget (%)
1948 2 n.a. 8.0 n.a.
1951 15 n.a. 2.5 n.a.
1954 575 7,668 4.0 0.9
1955 2,633 9.4 2.3
1960 6,381 29,272 15.2 2.6
1965 15,331 31,260 16.2 1.9
1970 78,476 78,476 17.5 2.9
1975 227,916 96,185 14.3 2.3
1980 1,099,159 173,667 18.9 3.2
1985 2,492,308 303,575 20.3 3.5
Source: Ministry of Education. Lee, 1988, p. 46.
The number of schools and vocational training centers has grown
dramatically. Indeed, vocational training was seen as so critical dur-
ing the industrialization drive that in 1976 the 1966 Vocational Train-
ing Law was amended to impose compulsory training on business
enterprises with two-hundred or more workers. Firms could provide
this by setting up in-house vocational training programs, or they could
finance training of their employees at vocational schools. Scientists
and engineers were seen as so critical to future growth that university
programs and graduate schools received special attention early in the
1970s. KAIS, as noted above, represented a turning point in the do-
mestic provision of graduate education in science and engineering, but
it was still only one component of a much larger strategy to provide
the brainpower needed to fulfill long-term economic planning goals.
The main point to be made by this listing of institutions and legis-
lation is that science and technology promotion is seen as an integral
part of the development process. The legal and institutional frame-
work provided a basis for supporting both broad-based technical ad-
vance and specifically targeted industries, such as electronics.
Available statistics suggest that government policy has had a signifi-
cant impact over time on national investment in science and technol-
ogy (see Table 4).
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Table 4
TRENDS OF S/T INVESTMENT AND R & D EXPENSES
Year 1965 1970 1975 1980 1983 1984 1985
(In billion won, current)
S/T investment 2.1 12.8 62.0 317.0 728.2 957.7 1,286.2
Gov. vs. Private 90:10 - - 68:32 38:62 32:68 28:72
% of GNP 0.26 0.47 0.61 0.86 1.23 1.44 1.77
R&D expenses 2.1 10.5 42.7 211.7 621.7 833.9 1,155.2
Gov. vs. Private 90:10 71:9 67:33 52:48 27:73 21:79 19:81
% of GNP 0.26 0.38 0.42 0.57 1.06 1.26 1.59
Source: Ministry of Science and Technology. Lee, 1988, p. 37.
2. Local Market Protection 16
Protection of the local market until local producers mature has
been a major policy of Korea's industrialization. Market protection
has been implemented through import licensing restrictions combined
with strong buy-national policies and high tariffs. For example, the
Electronics Machinery Industry Bureau of the Ministry of Trade and
Industry had to approve imports of computers and software, while the
Electronics Industry Association of Korea had to approve semicon-
ductors and electronic communication equipment. The approval de-
pended upon certifying need and a lack of domestic supply. Priority
was also given to foreign suppliers who had been cooperative in trans-
ferring technology to Korea in the past.
Since the early 1980s, most of the import licensing restrictions
have been eliminated and some tariff reductions have occurred. Buy-
national policies remain important. The success of these policies can
be seen in the growth of industry and the stimulation of foreign produ-
cers to invest in South Korea or provide technology transfer agree-
ments. Tariffs remain a substantial barrier by industrial country
standards.
A major revision of the foreign investment rules occurred in July,
1984: approvals switched from a positive to a negative list system, ap-
proval procedures were streamlined, and restrictions were reduced.
Many areas were liberalized. Still, key products remained protected.
16. Besides some of the sources noted above, the next three subsections draw from A. MODY,
RECENT EVOLUTION OF MICRO-ELECTRONICS IN KOREA AND TAIWAN: AN INSTITUTIONAL
APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE (1986) (manuscript published by AT&T Bell
Laboratories) and A. Patton, An Analysis of Industrial Targeting Tools Used in Korea's
Electronics Industry (July 16, 1985) (staff paper of the Office of the Pacific Basin, U.S. Dep't of
Com.).
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In the electronics industry, the 1984 negative list included mobile tele-
phone systems, portable radio communication equipment, radio sta-
tion communication equipment, optical fibers, and transformers.
Special approval to invest in Korea in an area on the restricted list
could be acquired, but the conditions usually required substantial
technology transfer, local control, and high use of domestically pro-
duced imports.
3. Tax Policy
Historically, tax incentives have been important industrial policy
instruments. In 1982, the Korean government eliminated many of the
industry-specific tax incentives. Tax incentives remain available to
strategic industries, however. As of 1986, companies could choose be-
tween tax credits from three to five percent of the invested amount or
accelerated depreciation of up to one-hundred percent of the normal
depreciation allowances. This choice was only available to the elec-
tronics and industrial machinery industries. The remaining targeted
industries were only eligible for the accelerated depreciation benefits.
Other tax incentives (including income tax exemptions and accelerated
depreciation) are granted on investments made by eligible small and
medium-sized firms in any high technology field.
4. Credit Policy
Credit management has long been the principal industrial policy
mechanism used by the South Korean government. Demand for funds
has always exceeded supply available at official interest rates.
Targeted industries have not only received preferential access but,
often, preferential interest rates. High-debt, high-growth corporations
are particularly sensitive to credit availability, and thus the govern-
ment has had strong leverage on their lehavior. Until very recently,
the banking system was under virtually full government control and
credit provided both the carrot and the stick to direct large corpora-
tions. Strategic industries have had access to a variety of different
sources of funds besides preferential bank lending. For example, in-
dustry also could draw on the Korean Development Investment Com-
pany, the Technology Development Fund, and the National
Investment Fund for preferential financing.
The Korean Development Investment Company, established in
1982, was Korea's first venture capital firm and was founded to fi-
nance high technology businesses and small and medium-sized firms
engaged in research and development work.
The Technology Development Fund, under the control of the Min-
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istry of Science and Technology, is financed by the Korean Develop-
ment Bank, the Medium Industrial Bank, and the Korean Technical
Development Corporation. In 1983, the fund had U.S. $214.3 million
available for loans. These funds are used for long-term preferential
loans to eligible firms planning to commercialize newly developed high
technology products or for procuring equipment for research labs.
Firms obligated to pay technical service fees for the construction of
industrial facilities or seeking foreign technology transfers also qualify
for Fund loans. The Fund provides eight- to ten-year loans with a
grace period of two to three years. In 1983, loans were being extended
at an interest rate of ten percent.
One of the oldest industrial policy funds is the National Invest-
ment Fund, established in 1974 to extend preferential loans to Korea's
strategic manufacturing industries. In the early 1980s, NIF funds
were being provided to heavy, chemical, electronic, and electric power
industries through intermediaries such as the Korean Development
Bank and Import-Export Bank of Korea. The NIF provides long-
term loans payable over ten years after an initial two- to three-year
grace period (at an interest rate of ten percent in 1983). The NIF was
being phased out throughout the 1980s.
B. Looking to the Future
The government has played an extensive role in guiding, pushing,
cajoling, and otherwise helping pave the way toward industrial devel-
opment. Heavy and detailed intervention into economic activity has
given way to policies of a more general character, although the gov-
ernment remains highly involved in major decisions. The long-term
planning process remains an important tool of economic management.
The various plans serve as major guides to detailed policymaking and
to the investment plans of firriis.
Several recent planning initiatives have had special implications for
the industrial structure and for trade. One is the project conducted by
the Korea Development Institute in 1984 called "Year 2000." This
was a major effort conducted with the cooperation and participation of
many governmenft agencies and all major research institutes. In 1986,
KAIST and MOST completed a companion study on Long-Term Per-
spectives for Science and Technology that builds on the Year 2000
project and feeds into the sixth five-year plan (1986-1991). Together
these plans have developed a framework of overall policy.
A view that permeates Korean long-term planning is that technol-
ogy is rapidly becoming the most important factor in social and eco-
nomic development. This is interpreted to imply an inevitable change
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in the international economic order that South Korea will want to be a
part of. Emerging facets of this new order imply that:
* Technology will join labor and capital as a fundamental basis
of economic competition for the foreseeable future;
* Competition in higher technology, due to the high risks and
large investments required, will create an oligopolistic market
that includes a relatively small group of industrialized producer
nations;
" Automation technology applied to existing industries will al-
most inevitably shift comparative advantage in industries that
are now labor-intensive back to the industrial countries;
" Economic progress in Korea will only be maintained through a
rapid acceleration of technological progress. It is in this con-
text that Korea's drive to build a large-scale technological base
in selected industries must be seen.
Korea has set itself the goal of achieving industrial country status
by the year 2000. Current plans aim for a ranking of fifteenth in terms
of gross national product, tenth in terms of trade volume, and in some
aggregate sense, a comparable ranking in industrial technology. Pol-
icy planners in conjunction with academics, industry leaders, and
others have identified five major areas of concentration: 1)
"Microelectronics, information and telecommunication technologies,
for an early realization of the so-called information society." 2) "In-
dustrial key technologies such as design, systems engineering, and
automation, for increasing value added and productivity of industrial
promotion." 3) "Specialty chemicals, new materials and genetic engi-
neering, for providing necessary support of industrial structure adjust-
ment." 4) "Energy and resource technologies for the stable growth of
the economy and industry." 5) "Public welfare technologies such as
environmental conservation and public health care for improvement of
public welfare."'
7
Individual initiatives in the five priority areas are to be selected
according to a variety of criteria including, among others,
* Economic return and growth potential,
* Probability of success,
" Indispensability relative to national security and socioeconomic
stability,
" Industrial and technological linkage effects, and
17. These quotations are from, and the following overview is based upon, a summary of
Korea's plans provided in Lee, supra note 14.
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* Future contribution to public welfare and new industrial
possibilities.
The "Long-Term Perspective for Science and Technology Devel-
opment to Year 2000" also recommends a basic policy strategy and
possible policy instruments to achieve a variety of goals in the areas of
manpower, investment, and a national R & D system: a technological
information system, financial and tax support mechanisms, the genera-
tion of markets for new technology products, technological intensifica-
tion of small businesses, formation of R & D estates, stimulating a
technology-oriented social culture, as well as promoting international
development and cooperation in science and technology.
In the investment policy area, plans call for research and develop-
ment investment to expand from about two percent of GNP in 1986,
to three percent of GNP in the 1990s, to five percent of GNP in 2001.
Roughly forty percent of this investment would be allocated from gov-
ernment, and sixty percent from the private sector, of which some
twenty percent of the total would be basic research. Besides noting
that current inducement policies for research and development are in-
adequate, the plan lacks specificity regarding the detailed instruments
for achieving these goals.
Great concern is expressed about avoiding the waste of duplicative
and overlapping investments and this concern is one reason for the
high priority given to establishing a research and development net-
work system that divides tasks among public and private research
groups in some sort of efficient manner. Little information exists
about how this system and its cross-links are to be used.
The structure, as presented, mirrors that which has emerged in the
industrial countries. Industrial firms and their laboratories are to fo-
cus on industrial technologies and their commercialization. Public in-
stitutes should emphasize mission-oriented applied research on
national projects involving high risk, great externalities, and long ges-
tation periods. Universities should be primarily responsible for basic
research and manpower development, while also cooperating with
public sector institutes on industrial research. In the long term, part
of this network would be Daeduc Science Town clones in various parts
of the country. This is seen as a means of enhancing the network
among scientists and engineers around the country as well as of help-
ing to balance the extremely uneven regional growth of South Korea.
The concern to avoid duplication and overlap, combined with the
drive to accelerate economic development to the maximum extent pos-
sible, logically led to an interest in building a nationwide network
designed to collect, manage, and distribute information. The Korea
[Vol. 11:472
Winter 1990] Development Strategies of South Korea and Taiwan 505
Institute for International Economics and Technology leads this effort,
which is intended to be integrated into a much more comprehensive
national computer network. Implementation of the nationwide com-
puter network is one of the policy issues currently simmering between
the U.S. and South Korea because of potential exclusionary aspects of
its implementation. However this potential dispute is resolved, the
Koreans see the information network as a building block in their na-
tional research and development system and, thus, critical to the na-
tion's future.
South Korea clearly learned a lesson from the Japanese experience
regarding the importance of stimulating the domestic market for prod-
ucts the government wished to promote. Historically, making a mar-
ket has almost always implied protection from foreign producers,
among other items. With foreign pressure for liberalization, explicit
protection will become more difficult, but protectionist strategies will
continue to be used. The main market protection policy identified and
discussed in the plan was the use of public procurement. Public pro-
curement is viewed as a way to reduce market uncertainties and to
impose quantity and quality specifications on domestic firms.
The underdeveloped nature of Korea's small and medium-sized
firms is a strong policy concern. The perceived success of small and
medium-sized companies in the United States, and the remarkable dy-
namism of small and medium-sized companies in Taiwan, seem to un-
derlie the Korean planners' focus on "economies of variety" as well as
6"economies of scale." The notion is that the economic structure of the
future is likely to be biased in favor of the former. The plan voices a
special concern that a wide variety of support measures in finance, tax,
information, and public procurement will be required to promote
small and medium-scaled industries in an era of rapid technological
advance.
IV. ASSESSMENT AND CONCLUSIONS
These rather lengthy reviews of economic development strategy
and policy provide useful insight into the process of trade policy for-
mulation, the specific instruments used, and likely future changes.
Both countries have treated economic development as a central na-
tional goal - necessary both for the preservation of their own national
security and as a key base for government legitimacy. The intensity
with which economic growth is viewed as an overriding national im-
perative has declined somewhat over time, as success has brought
other goals and concerns to the forefront. Nonetheless, growth re-
mains a key priority against which all other objectives will be weighed.
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Taiwan and South Korea are market economies that have been
guided with considerable government intervention. The extent of in-
tervention has changed in form and generally declined over time.
South Korea has used and continues to rely upon more detailed and
specific policy formulas than Taiwan. The great contrast in industrial
structure helps explain the different policy approaches. It would have
been extraordinarily difficult for Taiwan to provide detailed direction
to its thousands of small firms, while the highly concentrated indus-
trial structure of South Korea makes detailed guidance much easier
and, indeed, a deliberate policy, goal.
Economic and trade policy in both countries is of such importance
that it has been controlled at the highest levels of government and has
become increasingly reliant upon technocrats and technocratic ap-
proaches. Slowly, over time, more interests have begun to have an
influence on decisions. Most recently, the trend towards political lib-
eralization has made economic and trade policy formulation far more
complex, creating potentially more explosive issues with the two coun-
tries' respective trading partners.
Their relatively small size, lack of resources, and market orienta-
tion led both countries to terminate the import substitution strategy
early in their development and to turn to a focus on competitiveness in
foreign markets as a primary objective in industrial development strat-
egy. The goal was not simply to export, but to develop firms that
could compete on their own without government support. A wide ar-
ray of incentives, subsidies, and protectionist barriers has been used
over time to stimulate firms in industries deemed strategic. The list of
policies looks very similar to those employed by other countries.
The main difference has been that domestic distortions have been
kept to a minimum (with exceptions). Essentially, exporting firms
were usually not given large subsidies beyond that required to make
their input costs more or less equal to international prices; or, at least
they were not given subsidies for very long. They were, however, shel-
tered in the domestic market by protectionist barriers. Further, the
government often "made the market" for priority goods - through
procurement, local content requirements on foreign investors, and a
variety of other techniques.
Because of size differences, Taiwan has had to rely on a stronger
export orientation and less domestic protection than larger South Ko-
rea. Taiwan has also tended to reduce protection and relax investment
constraints more rapidly than South Korea.
In both countries, the bureaucracy has had wide discretion in in-
terpreting the complex rules of trade policy and at times seems to be
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formulating trade policy. This flexibility is at once a traditional part
of their respective legal systems and a deliberate strategy to permit
detailed intervention if conditions warrant. However, this discretion
sometimes leads to a situation in which trade policy pronouncements
are implemented slowly, or sometimes not at all. This problem has
been more pronounced in South Korea.
Despite important similarities, the basic approach to industrial de-
velopment differs significantly. South Korean policy favors large
projects, risk-taking, and technological leapfrogging. In the process,
Korea has developed some major world-class firms, with a weak and
thin support base of small and medium-sized firms, and limited flexi-
bility. Taiwan's approach has been much more cautious. Growth
with stability is the goal. Moreover, Taiwan has focused on creating a
more diversified and flexible economic base than South Korea. How-
ever, average firm size is small, limiting Taiwan's ability to move into
higher technology and capital-intensive production.
Trade policy increasingly reflects these industrial policy chal-
lenges. In different ways, both countries are seeking to localize pro-
duction. In Taiwan, the goal is to expand the scale of that production,
while in Korea the goal is to develop more small and medium-sized
local supplier firms.
As each looks to the future, modernization remains a key priority
in both countries. Trade policy will be used to support this drive to
modernize, but the range of flexibility is limited. Their economies
have become so complex that detailed intervention has become incon-
sistent with high growth, especially in South Korea. Moreover, inter-
national agreements and foreign pressures provide political and legal
constraints.
Both countries have identified industries required to pull their
economies into the future while maintaining strong international com-
petitiveness. The intended result is that these industries will both re-
place imports and provide for export growth. Besides high
technology, both nations, in differing degrees, have come to recognize
the need for a modern service sector. Taiwan, in particular, has begun
to use liberalization (of domestic and international barriers) to move
service industries forward. Foreign direct investment is seen as in-
creasingly critical for accelerating modernization in the services sector
in both countries.
Both South Korea and Taiwan see trade diversification as an eco-
nomic development goal. Excessive concentration on the U.S. as a
market and on Japan as a supplier results in serious vulnerability.
As their economies have developed, constituencies in both coun-
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tries have come to see that protection of intellectual property rights is
critical to future growth industries. Thus, internal forces will dovetail
with external pressures on this issue. Similarly, domestic pressures for
the liberalization, privatization, and modernization of internal finan-
cial markets are reinforcing foreign pressures for financial reform.
Finally, as both countries liberalize their international trade re-
gimes, the issue of internal market disruption due to rapid import
growth, foreign subsidies, and unfair trade practices is becoming a
more important topic of the policy debate.
